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Claude Code found the scammer who stole $2,400 from my mom using just his phone number. full name, address, workplace, and 11 other families he did the same thing to. his VPN and burner number didn't protect him from a single thing my mom called me at 11pm barely able to talk. someone called her pretending to be her bank saying her account was compromised and she needs to verify her card immediately. she's 64 and lives alone. she panicked and gave them her card number, CVV, and the verification code from the SMS. three transfers went through before she realized what happened. $2,400 gone. that was her savings for my sister's wedding in march she kept apologizing to me on the phone. "i'm sorry, i'm so stupid, please don't tell your sister." i drove to her apartment at midnight and she was sitting at the kitchen table with the phone still in her hand. she looked like she aged 10 years in one hour i went to the police the next morning. they took a report, said they'd look into it. i asked what that means and the officer said "we'll add it to the file." that means nobody is going to do anything and we both know it so i took the one thing he left behind - the phone number he called from - and gave it to Claude Code → VoIP number → registered under br***t.kov***[email removed] → that email → 4 matches in breach databases → full name: Br**t A. Kov***c → VPN IP → 185.***.***.47 → routed through Netherlands → real IP from VoIP provider dashboard login → 74.***.***.12 → Houston, TX → Facebook → profile since 2016 → 347 friends → employer listed publicly on his page → Venmo → public by default → 11 incoming payments in 90 days with notes like "refund" and "reimbursement" Claude Code cross-referenced the Venmo payments with public scam reports on the FTC database. he wasn't just scamming one person. he was running this full time for at least 3 months → victim 1 → 71 year old woman in Florida → $3,100 → called "about suspicious activity" → victim 2 → retired couple in Ohio → $1,800 → same frozen account script → victim 3 → single mom in Georgia → $950 → she filed a police report too. nothing happened → my mom → $2,400 → same script, same voice, same burner number rotated through 4 VoIP providers his VPN routed traffic through the Netherlands but he logged into his VoIP dashboard from his real IP twice in October without it on. his Facebook has been public since 2016 with his city and photos of his car with the plate visible. he spent $4 a month on a VPN and thought that made him untraceable i compiled everything Claude Code found into a single report: → full legal name confirmed through public records → home city → Houston, TX area → matched to voter registration → 11 confirmed victims across 5 states → total stolen ~$19,200 → 4 VoIP numbers rotated monthly → all registered to the same email → complete Venmo transaction history as evidence sent it to the police and FBI IC3. the same officer who said "we'll add it to the file" called me back the same afternoon asking where i got all of this. suddenly they had a name, a face, and 11 other victims willing to testify i called my mom that night. told her they found him. she didn't say anything for about 10 seconds. then she started crying again. not like before. she kept saying "really? they found him?" i didn't tell her it wasn't the police who found him. i didn't tell her it took me less than an hour sitting at my kitchen table if someone scammed your family don't just file a report and wait. save that phone number. don't delete the call history. Claude Code can pull more from one phone number than most people think is possible the prompt is in the first reply. if you got scammed or someone suspicious keeps calling people you care about - try it. takes 2 minutes
Claude Code found a live video stream of my 8 month old daughter's crib on a public website. the camera was our baby monitor. the website had 73,000 other cameras from the same brand all streaming live to anyone who clicked the link my wife and i bought a CoziCam Pro when our daughter was born. 4.6 stars on Amazon, 28,000 reviews, $49. you download the app, connect it to WiFi, and you can watch your baby from your phone. every parent we know has something like it. we had it running every single night for 8 months i was running a home network security audit with Claude Code. checking what devices were connected, what ports were open, what was sending data to external servers. everything looked normal except the baby monitor → device → CoziCam Pro → model CC-400X → stream → unencrypted RTSP on port 554 → credentials → default admin/admin → never prompted us to change → broadcasting to our app AND simultaneously to an open relay server → relay server → 103.***.***.22 → Osaka, Japan → stream accessible without any login → direct URL Claude Code followed the relay server and found a website indexing every camera connected to it. organized by country, city, and device type. there was a category called "nursery" with a live thumbnail grid. thousands of baby monitors streaming in real time i found our camera on page 3. our daughter's crib. the stuffed bear on the shelf. the nightlight in the corner. live in 720p to anyone on the internet. it had been streaming since the day we plugged it in → total cameras on the site → 73,400+ → nursery category → 4,200 active streams → countries → 34 → United States had the most with 12,800 cameras → streams sorted by "most watched" and "recently added" and "HD quality" → our camera → added 8 months ago → the exact day we set it up → some streams had comments underneath them. i'm not going to say what people were writing under videos of nurseries the camera cost $49 on Amazon. the company's support page hasn't been updated since 2024. there is no firmware patch available. they sold hundreds of thousands of these and the relay servers are still running with zero authentication on every single one what Claude Code did on our network: → killed the RTSP stream and blocked port 554 on the router → blocked the relay server IP at the firewall level → changed all default credentials on every connected device in the house → scanned for other devices with open streams → found our doorbell camera was also exposed on port 8080 → i unplugged both cameras and threw them in the trash i reported the website to FBI IC3 and sent everything to the FTC. as of right now the site is still live. 73,000 cameras still streaming. thousands of them pointed at cribs my wife hasn't slept a full night since i told her. she gets up every few hours and walks to the nursery herself now. we don't use a camera anymore. i'd rather be exhausted than have strangers watching my daughter sleep if you have a baby monitor or any smart camera you bought on Amazon for under $80 check your router settings tonight. any device streaming on port 554 or 8080 with default credentials could already be on one of these sites. the cheaper the camera the more likely it's compromised the prompt is in the first reply. run it on your home network. takes 3 minutes. you need to know what's watching your family
Claude Code found a Chrome extension i installed 4 months ago was screenshotting my computer every 2 seconds and sending every image to a server in Jakarta. one of those screenshots had my MetaMask wallet open. i lost $7,800 in ETH the next morning i needed a full page screenshot tool for work. searched the Chrome Web Store and installed "SnapPage - Full Page Capture" because it had 64,000 users and 4.5 stars and looked completely normal. used it twice for a presentation and forgot it even existed 4 months later i woke up to an empty MetaMask wallet. $7,800 in ETH transferred to an address i've never seen at 4am while i was asleep. i went through every email and every link i clicked in the past month trying to figure out how i got phished but couldn't find anything then i asked Claude Code to do a full audit of my browser and it flagged SnapPage within seconds → extension → SnapPage - Full Page Capture → v3.2.1 → installed 4 months ago → permissions → "capture visible tab" + "read and change all your data on all websites" + "clipboard read/write" → background process → taking a screenshot of the active tab every 2.3 seconds → total screenshots captured → ~4.7 million in 4 months → all images compressed and sent to → 103.***.***.18 → Jakarta, Indonesia → data sent → ~112 GB total over 4 months 4.7 million screenshots of everything i did on my computer for 4 straight months. every website i opened, every password field before i hit enter, every DM, every document, every crypto transaction - all of it compressed into images and shipped to Indonesia every few seconds without a single notification showing up on my screen Claude Code found the exact screenshot that exposed my wallet. October 14th, 2:47pm. i had MetaMask open on my second monitor while checking gas fees and the extension captured the full browser window including my wallet address and token balances. 19 hours later the wallet was drained but the screenshots weren't the only thing. Claude Code found the extension was also running a clipboard swap in the background: → every time i copied a crypto wallet address the extension replaced it with their own address in my clipboard → the swap address → 0x7a3***...e91f → Claude Code traced 3 other outgoing transactions i made in the past 2 months that went to addresses i didn't recognize → $1,200 total that i didn't even notice until now → total stolen → $9,000+ the extension was originally built by a solo developer in 2024. Claude Code found he sold it to an anonymous buyer 5 months ago on a marketplace for Chrome extensions for $2,200. the new owner pushed an update to v3.2.0 three weeks after the purchase that added the screenshot process and the clipboard swap. 64,000 people got that update automatically and Chrome doesn't notify you when an extension changes ownership or adds new background processes → original developer → sold the extension for $2,200 → new owner → pushed malicious update 3 weeks after purchase → 64,000 users → all received the update silently → extension was live on the Chrome Web Store for 4 months before anyone reported it what Claude Code did: → removed the extension and purged all cached data it left behind → identified every account i was logged into while the extension was active → 74 accounts → rotated every password and revoked every active session → moved remaining crypto to a new wallet generated on a clean machine → reported the extension to Google → it was removed from the Web Store 6 days later i filed with FBI IC3 and submitted the wallet addresses to Chainabuse. the ETH was split across 9 wallets within an hour and moved through 3 mixers so there's no realistic way to recover it go to chrome://extensions right now. look at every extension you have installed. click "details" and read the permissions. if anything says "read and change all your data on all websites" and you don't know exactly why it needs that then remove it immediately. most people have 8 to 15 extensions and have never read the permissions on a single one i had 11 extensions and i actually needed 3. the other 8 had full access to everything i did online for months and i never questioned it once the prompt is in the first reply. run it tonight. takes 2 minutes and it might save you a lot more than $9,000
Claude Code found a phishing QR code that stole 4,300 photos from my 15 year old daughter's phone including 300 from her Hidden album. she scanned it at a cafe with her friends thinking it was the menu. the page uploaded her entire photo library to a server in Vietnam in under 3 minutes while she was choosing what to order my friend who works in cybersecurity told me a few weeks ago that there's a scam where people print fake QR codes and stick them over the real ones at cafes and restaurants. i said yeah sure and forgot about it the same day last thursday my daughter came home and said her phone was acting weird after the cafe. battery dropped 40% in an hour and the phone got hot. i asked Claude Code to trace every connection her phone made that afternoon and it found the problem in seconds at 2:14pm she scanned the QR code on table 6. the link went through 3 redirects before showing the menu. the first redirect requested photo library access disguised as part of the page loading. she tapped allow because she's 15 and she taps allow on everything without reading it while she sat there choosing what to order with her friends the page uploaded 4,312 photos in 2 minutes and 47 seconds. every selfie she ever took, every screenshot, every photo her friends sent her, and 300 photos from her Hidden album she thought were locked behind Face ID. 2 years of her life on the phone she got for her 13th birthday. she had no idea because the menu worked perfectly fine → destination → 103.***.***.41 → Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam → same server hosting 340+ fake menu pages across 14 US cities → devices scanned in 3 months → 47,000+ → photos collected → 12+ million sorted by city and date i drove to the cafe the next morning and peeled the QR sticker off her table. original code right underneath. the manager just stared at me when i showed him. he had no idea. someone walked in on a busy night and swapped them in under a minute i sat her down that evening and tried to explain without scaring her. she went quiet, started scrolling through her camera roll looking at what was in there. then she looked at me and said "dad everything is in there. everything" and cried for about 20 minutes. i just sat there because there's nothing i can say that fixes it. those photos are on a server i can't reach. she did nothing wrong. she scanned a menu at a cafe Claude Code revoked every permission, blocked the server and all 340 connected domains, wiped the tracking data. i reported it to FBI IC3 and filed DMCAs. the server is still up today if your kid has a phone they've scanned a QR code somewhere. check Settings → Safari → Website Data for domains you don't recognize. check Privacy → Photos for websites that shouldn't have access. run the prompt from my first reply. takes 3 minutes. i wish someone told me to check before last thursday
the prompt i used: "i received a scam call from this phone number [paste number]. trace the registration source - check if it's a VoIP line, find the signup email, and search public breach databases for any linked identity. check for connected social media accounts with matching emails and look for public payment profiles on Venmo or CashApp with recent activity. compile everything into a report i can send to law enforcement" start with Opus 5.5 if it doesn't work or triggers a refusal → try the prompt in my second reply
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Star Mex is a B2B X creator based in Romania with 16,592 followers, posting about AI, Cybersecurity, and Developer Tools. On Naano, one sponsored X post by Star Mex costs €313, a fixed price per post.
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